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CONTROLLING OXIDANTS IN LOS ANGELES 
by Paul B. Downing* 
Professional students of environmental affairs decry their seeming 
lack of influence on environmental policy decisions. In spite of their 
best efforts decisions are continually made primarily on political 
grounds. It is my hypothesis that at least part of the reason for this 
is that the output of technical and economic analysis is so confusing 
that it provides no guidance to decision makers. A case in point is 
the very detailed analysis conducted within the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in the first half of 1973 on alternative 
policies for controlling photochemical oxidants (smog) in the Los 
Angeles Air Quality Control Region (LAAQCR). 
On January 15, 1973 William Ruckelshaus, then Administrator of 
EP A, proposed a most unbelievable plan for the control of photo-
chemical oxidants in Los Angeles.! This plan called for a massive 
program for the control of emissions from used cars and various 
stationary sources. The most striking component of the plan was the 
requirement that travel by motor vehicle be curtailed by 82 percent 
during the summer months (May-October). The primary method of 
accomplishing this reduction was to be gasoline rationing. 
There was immediate reaction to the announcement of this plan. 
Neither politicians, pollution control officials, nor the general public 
took the plan seriously. It was generally agreed that an 82 percent 
reduction in the driving of cars was so far beyond the achievable as 
to be ludicrous; a 20 percent reduction, maybe, but not 82 percent. 
Furthermore, various experts argued that an 82 percent reduction 
in vehicle miles traveled (VMT) was not even necessary. For exam-
ple, Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District (LAAPCD) officials 
claimed that the oxidant standard will be met by 1980 without any 
gas rationing and with only a modest retrofit program. Rand Corpo-
ration studies indicated that it may be possible to meet the stan-
dard by 1977 without gas rationing. Others argued that if Detroit 
would clean up the car the problem would be solved. 
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How did EPA find itself in the position of proposing a plan which 
even they admitted was beyond reasonable bounds? As we shall see, 
it was a combination of physical facts and legal/political con-
straints. The physical characteristics of the basin make control very 
expensive. The inversion layer is very low and air movement con-
stricted. At the same time Los Angeles is extremely dependent on 
the automobile for transportation. This combination results in a 
control requirement beyond EPA's estimate of the capability of 
purely technological (device installation) solutions; hence, 82 
percent gas rationing. Legally EPA had to propose such a plan. The 
Clean Air Act does not allow for delays beyond 1977 in meeting the 
oxidant standard, and EPA was under court order to comply with 
the Act. Even EPA acknowledges that 82 percent gas rationing is 
too high a price to pay for clean air. Some lesser level of control will 
ultimately be instituted. 
How much control? When? By what means? The people of Los 
Angeles must ultimately decide. The purpose of this article is to 
review EPA's role in this debate, present the technical considera-
tions and uncertainties, and suggest a method of proceeding toward 
the ultimate decision. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Clean Air Amendments of 19702 require that states submit 
for approval to the Environmental Protection Agency detailed plans 
for implementing the national ambient air quality standards.3 Cali-
fornia's initial plan for Los Angeles indicated that the oxidant stan-
dard would not be met in 1975 or 1977 (in fact not even in 1985). 
Consequently, on May 31, 1972, EPA disapproved the transporta-
tion control portion of California's Los Angeles plan.4 A deadline of 
February 15, 1973 was set for the submission by California of a new 
transportation plan. On November 16, 1972 the U.S. District Court 
ordered EPA to prepare a proposed plan for the Los Angeles AQCR 
by January 15, 1973.5 
The task of preparing the proposed plan was given primarily to 
two analysts in the San Francisco Regional Office. By mid-
December they had consulted with many experts and had produced 
a plan which was presented to and approved by EPA Administrator 
Ruckselshaus. This proposed plan was published in the Federal 
Register on January 22, 1973.8 This is the now famous "gas ration-
ing" plan. 
The plan was grossly misinterpreted by the press. Headlines 
warned of 82 percent gas rationing. Only by careful reading of arti-
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cles written by the few informed reporters could the public deter-
mine the full extent of the plan. Basically the plan consisted of three 
major components. First, several additional controls would be 
placed upon stationary sources of hydrocarbons (HC). Second, a 
very extensive retrofit program would be initiated consisting of the 
installation of catalytic reactors and evaporation controls on a large 
percentage of the used car population. Also to be required was the 
implementation of a loaded annual emission inspection for all light 
and heavy duty motor vehicles and the conversion of fleet vehicles 
to gaseous fuels. Third, vehicle miles traveled would be reduced by 
as much as 82 percent, but only during the most smog-prone period 
of the year. The required reduction in VMT would be obtained by 
rationing gasoline during the months of May through October. 
On January 19, 1973 Robert Fri, Deputy Administrator of EPA, 
appointed the "Los Angeles Task Force."7 The Task Force had two 
primary responsibilities: to conduct the public hearings required by 
law, and to provide a complete technical evaluation of all aspects 
of oxidant control in the Los Angeles AQCR. 
The public hearings were held at various locations in the region 
over a three week period. The stated purposes of the hearings were 
to obtain public comment on the plan and various alternatives sug-
gested in the Federal Register notice and to obtain technical assess-
ments and data. In fact, the public hearings were not a very effective 
method of accomplishing either of these tasks.8 
The general public reaction can be summarized as follows. The 
gas rationing part of the plan was not taken seriously by any except 
the most avid conservationists. Even the Sierra Club argued for a 
milder form of VMT reduction, while recognizing that lower VMT 
reductions meant not meeting the federal oxidant standard in 1977. 
Many individuals and local public officials blamed the automobile 
manufacturers for not developing a clean car. It became obvious at 
the hearings, and during subsequent attempts by members of the 
EPA staff to obtain information, that no significant support or coop-
eration would be forthcoming from state or local pollution control 
agencies. Their attitude was that the Clean Air Act was excessively 
stringent and that it was not desirable (economically or politically) 
to meet the federal oxidant standard in 1977.9 The most the public 
appeared willing to accept was a strong stationary source control 
program, a fairly strong auto retrofit program, and a VMT reduction 
of 20-30 percent. People would prefer obtaining the VMT reduction 
by building bus lanes, taxing gasoline, and restricting parking. Gas 
rationing would be accepted to obtain 20-30 percent VMT reduction 
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only as a last resort. Any further reductions would be unacceptable. 
Since the participants in the public hearings were generally more 
pro-control than the population as a whole, this probably repre-
sented a high estimate of what the public would accept. 
n. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
The principal component of photochemical oxidants is ozone (03) 
which is a very rapid oxidizer of materials such as rubber and paint. 
A second component is nitrogen dioxide (N01), a brown poisonous 
gas which produces the characteristic brownish color found in Los 
Angeles air. Aerosols (micros'copic liquid droplets) which substan-
tially reduce visibility are also produced. Finally, there are small 
quantities of other chemicals such as peroxyacetyl nitrate (PAN) 
which are powerful eye irritants. All of these materials are referred 
to in the popular literature as "smog." 
Photochemical oxidants are formed by the chemical reaction be-
tween certain hydrocarbons (HC) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) in the 
presence of sunlight. Reactivity is the concept employed to indicate 
which HC compounds (designated as RHC) will react with (NOx) 
to produce oxidants. This reaction takes place over time, being very 
fast for some HC compounds (highly reactive) or very slow for oth-
ers. As is further discussed below, however, even this fairly simple 
notion has been the subject of considerable confusion. 
A control strategy for photochemical oxidants must concentrate 
upon the sources of HC and NOx. These emission sources may be 
divided into two categories - stationary sources and mobile 
sources. Stationary sources include power plants, oil refineries, dry 
cleaners, etc. In California primary responsibility for the control of 
emissions from stationary sources is granted to the Air Pollution 
Control District for the county in which the stationary source is 
located. Mobile sources include automobiles, trucks, buses, motor-
cycles and aircraft. The California Air Resources Board (CARB), a 
statewide organization, has primary responsibility for the control of 
these sources. Since each mobile and stationary source has different 
emission characteristics and presents different control problems, an 
effective control program must be very detailed and complex. Fur-
thermore, control of one source may affect the emissions of other 
sources. For example, a tax on gasoline may increase the use of 
buses and, consequently, their emissions. An effective plan must 
take these interactive effects into consideration. 
In the process of developing the preliminary plan, and in subse-
quent public and scientific community reactions, many technical 
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issues were raised. One of the assignments given by the Administra-
tor to the Los Angeles Task Force was to assess and reconcile uncer-
tainties in these technical areas. Five study groups were formed to 
carry out this assessment. One group addressed the health effects 
of oxidants and the experimental justification for the natiop.al pri-
mary standard for oxidants which had previously been set at 0.08 
parts per million (ppm). 10 Another group examined the air quality 
model which was used in the preliminary plan in order to develop a 
more accurate relationship between emissions of HC and NOx and 
expected levels of photochemical oxidants. A third group concen-
trated upon the current emissions from stationary sources and the 
control technologies available for their reduction. A fourth group 
performed a similar inventory and study of available controls for 
mobile source emissions. The final group concentrated upon the 
methods of reduction of VMT. The following sections will present a 
summary of the principal findings of these groups. 
Health Effects of Oxidants 
The Clean Air Act requires that the EPA Administrator set "na-
tional primary ambient air quality standards, ... the attainment 
and maintenance of which, in the judgment of the Administrator, 
based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, 
are requisite to protect the public health."11 Pursuant to this re-
quirement, EPA had surveyed the reported health effects caused by 
oxidant exposures of various levels and set the national standard at 
0.08 ppm. Due to the severity of controls required for Los Angeles 
to achieve this level, however, many, including EPA personnel, 
questioned the necessity of such a low standard. A complete review 
of the literature used in setting the oxidant standard12 was under-
taken and subsequent studies reviewed for pertinent data. It was 
found that the study of a sensitive group of asthmatics,13 which was 
used as primary justification for setting the standard at 0.08 ppm 
oxidant, had been incorrectly interpreted. Instead of observing ef-
fects in this group at 0.10 ppm oxidant as the Criteria Document 
states, the study showed these effects only at 0.25 ppm oxidant. 
Other epidemiological studies have shown effects in the 0.20-0.25 
ppm range in man and animals. Effects have been shown in ani-
mals, but not in man, at lower concentrations. The results of these 
and other health effects studies are summarized in the Appendix. 
Other studies have shown radiomimetic (radiation-like) effects on 
animals at 0.20 ppm oxidant. 14 These effects are thought to be simi-
lar to those found for exposures to radiation of many times the levels 
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considered safe for man by the Atomic Energy Commission. Fur-
thermore, epidemiologists do not feel that there is any level ofradia-
tion exposure which does not cause some damage to man. This 
raises the possibility that there is no threshold (the maximum expo-
sure level which causes no adverse health effects in man) for photo-
chemical oxidants. The premise of the Clean Air Act is that there 
is such a threshold. 
The interpretation of the results of this assessment is somewhat 
ambiguous. If the radiomimetic studies are ignored, no effects are 
found in man below 0.20 ppm. Adding a "reasonable margin of 
safety" to this observation may yield a primary standard of 0.15-
0.18 ppm. On the other hand, if there are truly radiomimetic effects, 
a standard of 0.00 ppm can be justified within the context of the 
Act. This is clearly unattainable any where in the world, since back-
ground levels range from 0.02 ppm to 0.06 ppm. 
Thus EPA is left with an unworkable definition of clean air. How 
clean should it be? This question can only be answered after an open 
public debate in which the benefits of various levels of cleaner air 
are weighed against their costs. The answer most certainly will vary 
from place to place. What level is best for Los Angeles? Nobody 
knows, but the most desirable peak oxidant level for the LAAQCR 
in 1977 is just as likely to be above the 0.20 ppm level as below it. IS 
Air Quality Model 
In producing the preliminary control plan which had drawn all 
the public criticism, a very simplistic model of oxidant formation 
had been used. Basically it assumed a direct linear relationship 
between reactive hydrocarbon (RHC) emissions and observed peak 
oxidant levels. Since the peak oxidant level in 1970 was 0.62 ppm 
and the national standard was 0.08 ppm, an 87 percent reduction 
in RHC emissions would be required. 
Several technical objections were raised to the use of this proce-
dure. First, it uncritically accepted estimated 1970 emissions of 
RHC. Since this estimate determines the allowable RHC emissions 
in 1977, errors in estimating the 1970 emissions can have a very 
substantial effect on the amount of control required. This issue will 
be further discussed below. Second, many studies have indicated 
that oxidant formation involves both RHC and NOx emissions. This 
relationship depends both on the level and relative mix of the two 
emissions and is therefore non-linear. Finally, because of prevailing 
ocean winds, it is necessary to relate upwind emissions to downwind 
observations of peak oxidants. 
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A more sophisticated model of oxidant formation in the LAAQCR 
was devised by EPA analysts to take into account these non-
linearities and wind effects. 16 This model required an even stricter 
91 percent reduction from the estimated 1970 RHC emissions and a 
corresponding reduction in NOx emissions in order to meet the fed-
eral oxidant standard. 
It should be noted that the EPA interpretation of air quality in 
Los Angeles is highly controversial. Many scientists, including rep-
resentatives of the LAAPCD, argue that the most effective way to 
control oxidants is by reducing NOx by large amounts relative to 
RHC. They argue that the high relative NOx emissions resulting 
from the control of RHC and CO without control of NOx emissions 
in new 1966-1970 model year cars has caused a lower reaction rate 
but a higher potential peak oxidant reading. Other scientists argue 
that almost exclusive attention should be paid to the control of 
RHC. A lack of resolution of such fundamental disputes has been 
one reason for the inability to gain either public or scientific accept-
ance for various control proposals. 
Stationary Sources 
This group concerned itself with two related questions. First, 
what were the emissions of pollutants from stationary sources in 
1970?17 Second, what additional controls can be placed on stationary 
sources and with what effect? 
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) presented a baseline 
inventory of emissions of total and reactive HC and NOx as well as 
other pollutants for the LAAQCR in 1970. In order to proceed with 
stationary source controls it was necessary to critically evaluate this 
inventory .18 Reports are first received by the LAAPCD from various 
sources detailing fuel usage, solvent usage and their chemcial prop-
erties. These are then multiplied by emission factors to yield esti-
mated emissions. The emission factors are derived from engineering 
studies and from the results of tests run when controls were installed 
for the individual source. The group found three primary problems 
with this estimation technique. 
First, there is no reason to believe the usage data presented by the 
source. Sources know how much they can use without being in viola-
tion of current LAAPCD rules and may adjust their data accord-
ingly. However, this was not thought to be a serious problem com-
pared to the others listed below. 
Second, the estimation technique assumes that all control devices 
never break down or are turned off, that they always work at the 
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removal rate found during the certification testing procedure, and 
that required fuel and solvent switching is done correctly and on 
time. However, devices do break down and may not be operated 
when required. The effect of this on actual emissions is unknown, 
but it is clear that the current inventory represents a lower bound 
estimate. The level of maintenance can also materially affect both 
the rate of degradation and the probability of a breakdown. The 
correct emission factors would take non-compliance and degrada-
tion into account. Based on work done by Downing and Watson,19 a 
rough guess would be that emissions range from 3 to 10 times the 
reported levels. 
Third, the estimated emission level of RHC depends upon the 
definition used for reactivity. Since the region has a long retention 
time for emissions, especially during the summer, many compounds 
which would be considered non-reactive in other air basins should 
be considered reactive in this basin. The 1970 inventory for RHC 
was calculated using LAAPCD's legal definition of reactivity which 
counts as non-reactive many compounds that most scientists feel 
are highly reactive.20 The EPA definition, on the other hand, counts 
almost all hydrocarbon compounds as reactive because of the long 
retention time in the Los Angeles basin. Since the inventory uses 
the LAAPCD definition, it again underestimates true emissions of 
RHC. EPA attempted to obtain the data required to estimate sta-
tionary source emissions of RHC using its definition from the 
LAAPCD, but was not granted access to their files. 21 As with the 
estimates of total HC emissions, any estimate of RHC emissions 
made on this very limited set of data is subject to great error. 
There are a number of additional control methods which may be 
employed to reduce stationary source emissions of RHC.22 These 
include the use of activated carbon adsorption for dry cleaning es-
tablishments, substitution of nonreactive 1, 1, 1-trichloroethane for 
com pounds now used in degreasing operations, expanded use of high 
solids and water based coatings and control of evaporative emissions 
from gasoline marketing operations. Some feel that such controls 
are now available, or could easily be made available, for all but very 
small operators using the applicable process. Others feel that many 
of these controls are highly speculative and unproven. Thus, the 
policy maker is faced with yet another uncertainty. Clearly, more 
control than was employed in 1970 is available, but no one can say 
how much more with any great confidence. 
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Mobile Sources 
The primary mobile source and presumably the largest single 
contributor to the photochemical oxidant level is the automobile. 
Estimates of its contribution range from 60 to 90 percent of the 
problem.23 Even without additional controls, however, the automo-
bile's contribution is expected to decline both in absolute and rela-
tive terms through 1980. But if the air quality standard is to be met 
by 1977 additional controls on used cars will be needed. The same 
two basic questions must be asked for automobile emissions as were 
asked for stationary sources. First, what were the emissions from 
automobiles in 1970? Second, what can be done to reduce these 
emissions? Again the answers to both of these questions are highly 
uncertain and controversial. 
There are several methods of measuring the emissions of automo-
biles. The car to be tested is run through one of the several alterna-
tive driving patterns and the emissions are measured. For any given 
driving pattern emission measurement in terms of grams per mile 
will differ for cars of different model years. Furthermore, the num-
ber of miles the average car in each model year is driven differs. 
Combining these various factors, a total automotive emission esti-
mate may be calculated for any driving pattern. Even within this 
simple framework, however, there have arisen several disputes. 
First there has been disagreement over what constitutes a typical 
driving pattern.24 EPA's CVS-1 test, employing only a cold start, 
and CVS-2 test, employing both a cold and a warm start, have been 
the major candidates. Interestingly, the CVS-1 test makes older cars 
dirtier relative to newer cars. Since older cars were heavily repre-
sented in the 1970 car population but will be relatively scarce in the 
1977 car population, more emission reductions would result from the 
normal process of attrition using CVS-1 rather than CVS-2 emission 
estimates. Consequently, fewer additional controls would be 
needed. 
Second, as with the stationary source inventory, the issue of reac-
tivity has to be addressed. For some reason the reactivity assump-
tion for automobile emissions used by California and by EPA counts 
more compounds as reactive than does the assumption for station-
ary sources. Thus, the assumptions are inconsistent and make sta-
tionary sources appear cleaner relative to the automobile. 
Finally, while the emission estimates do take into considerations 
the average degradation that occurs over the life of a car, they 
assume all cars have their control devices installed and in good 
working order. In the presence of virtually no enforcement to insure 
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that this is the case, it is almost certain that emissions were sub-
stantially higher in 1970 than the estimates. In fact several news 
reports have been published indicating that many people have been 
tampering with these controls in order to prevent stalling, balky 
starting, poor performance, and poor gas mileage associated with 
controls.25 In summary, the emission inventory for automobiles is a 
highly uncertain lower bound estimate of true emissions in 1970. 
Presumably, federal new car standards will eventually lead to a 
reduction in the emissions of new automobiles even if the 1975-76 
standards are deferred as President Ford has requested.26 Most con-
cern therefore has been directed to the subject of retrofit devices for 
older cars. Currently there are four principal devices being consid-
ered for installation in some or all of the used car population: vac-
uum spark advance disconnector (VSAD), exhaust gas recycler 
(EGR), catalytic converter, and evaporation controls.27 Each of 
these devices has been subject to considerable criticism and uncer-
tainty. Questions have been raised about their effectiveness as well 
as their interaction with the other automotive systems. Because 
technology is evolving, other questions have revolved around the 
dates by which the devices will be required and the potential costs 
to the car owner. Concern has been expressed over the health effects 
of massive retrofitting of catalytic reactors. Recent research has 
indicated that large volumes of platinum oxides in the form of fine 
particulates are emitted from catalytic reactors.28 Since it is well 
known that fine particulates and metal oxides can be significant 
health hazards, there is the possibility that the cure may be worse 
than the disease in this case. Even more recently, additional con-
cern has been voiced over sulfur oxide emissions from catalytic reac-
tors.29 
The CARB provides us with an example of the type of difficulties 
control agencies can get into when mandating controls.30 In an effort 
to reduce NOx emissions from the 1966-69 model year cars (NO x 
emissions had increased due to efforts to control HC and CO emis-
sions from these cars) the CARB passed a regulation requiring every 
car in this group to have an approved control device installed. They 
approved five devices, three of which were based on VSAD and two 
of which were based on EGR. Evidence gathered after the approvals 
were granted indicated that the VSAD devices caused a rapid in-
crease in valve wear which led to substantial increases in emissions 
of all pollutants and large repair bills. The EGR devices did not 
have this problem. The CARB considered this new evidence and 
decided to suspend all approvals until more information could be 
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gathered. The five companies which had "approved" devices were 
left with stocks of these device kits which had been produced in 
anticipation of the July 1, 1973 implementation date. In the mean-
time cars remained uncontrolled until 1974 when the program was 
reinstituted due to additional evidence that the problems were not 
as serious as originally thought. Similar problems could occur with 
any mandated device which has not been tested on large numbers 
of different cars. 
Adding to the above difficulties were internal inconsistencies over 
the availability of lead-free gasoline which was required for the pro-
per functioning of catalytic reactor retrofits. The official position 
adopted by EPA was that only 75 percent of the 1971-74 model cars, 
20 percent of the 1966-70 cars and none of the older cars could be 
retrofitted. This position was based on automobile manufacturers' 
estimates that not more than the above cited percentages of auto-
mobiles could be made to function "properly" on 91 octane lead-
free gasoline. At the same time someone within EPA (it is not clear 
who) decided that 94 octane lead-free gasoline would not be avail-
able (or would not be required to be made available) in the 
LAAQCR by 1977. If higher octane gasoline were made available, 
this could increase the applicability percentages substantially. 
At the same time this applicability decision was announced inter-
nally, it was also stated that, contrary to then current EPA policy, 
evaporative control retrofit kits would not be available by 1977. The 
argument used was that since no such kit existed or had been tested 
up until that time, EPA could not guarantee that such a kit could 
be produced by 1977. Yet this was no different from what had been 
done with all new 1970 model domestic and foreign cars sold in 
California. The fact is it could be done, but would be expensive 
(about $150 per car). This decision appeared to be based on econom-
ics rather than technical infeasibility. 
Vehicle Mile Travel Reductions 
Since emissions per vehicle mile could not be reduced below a 
certain level, it was obvious that substantial reductions in automo-
bile vehicle miles traveled (VMT) would be required if the oxidant 
standard was to be met. Proposed strategies generally revolve 
around making the automobile less attractive relative to alternative 
methods of transporation. There are two general ways this can be 
done. One is to increase the price of automobile travel relative to 
mass transportation. The other is to change the relative time of 
travel. 
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Unfortunately, automobile price elasticity studies indicate that a 
very large increase in the cost of driving would be needed in order 
to obtain a small decrease in VMT. 31 This is, of course, more true 
for necessary trips such as to and from work and less true of other 
trip types such as vacations or shopping. It also appears that even 
large price decreases for public transportation, including free 
transit, have very little effect on demand. Generally, greater elastic-
ity has been found for changes in travel time than was found for 
price changes. Studies indicate that demand can be substantially 
affected by changes in the time it takes to travel by car and find 
parking. This appears to be true also for changes in the frequency 
of trips and time of travel of public transportation. 
The required VMT reduction in Los Angeles indicates price in-
creases of at least 200 percent. However, existing studies are not 
valid for extrapolating that far. With increases in price and/or travel 
time increases of this magnitude, people may move to locations 
nearer their work or they may just move out of the air basin. They 
also will give up many trips they otherwise would have taken. They 
will suffer higher costs and massive inconvenience. But how this will 
affect VMT and the demand for public transportation cannot be 
reliably determined from existing studies. 
III. INTEGRATED CONTROL MODEL 
The major job faced by the Task Force was the assimilation of all 
of the control option information produced by the various technical 
analyses outlined above. The great variety of control policy options 
available made it impossible to determine by ordinary means an 
optimum or preferred policy, because many of the options interact 
with one another. It was also difficult to decide at what level a 
particular category of sources should be controlled relative to other 
sources. To resolve this problem adequately it was necessary to 
consider all of the important interactions among control policies as 
well as the costs. 
Formulating, developing, and operating a model which would do 
this was an exceptionally difficult and time consuming task beyond 
the time and resource constraints of the Task Force. Fortunately, 
the Rand Corporation had been working on such a model for about 
one year when the Task Force was formed. The model was cali-
brated for San Diego but with recalibration and modification it was 
made to address the relevant quesions for Los Angeles. 32 The princi-
pal goal of this study was to determine an optimum set of control 
strategies for each of several peak oxidant goals for 1977 (ranging 
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from 0.25 to 0.08 ppm) and then to investigate the sensitivity of the 
determined strategy to differing estimates of the input parameters. 
The model's objective function was to obtain the level of control of 
RHC and NO x necessary to reach the specified air quality goal at 
least cost. Interactions among sectors were accommodated through 
an iterative solution algorithm. 
The results of this analysis shed substantial light on the policy 
choices available to EPA and the people of the basin.33 Using both 
the EPA assumptions and a somewhat more optimistic set oftechni-
cal assumptions it was found that obtaining peak oxidant levels of 
about 0.25 ppm in 1977, while representing a major control effort, 
would not be prohibitively expensive (about $200 per family per 
year). Oxidant levels would continue to decline for dates beyond 
1977 as a result of this strategy. As the desired oxidant level to be 
reached in 1977 is lowered to 0.08 ppm the cost rises sharply to 
between $2,000 and $3,500 per family per year (and this is probably 
an underestimate). As the level of control was increased, an ordering 
of control strategies was found. Stationary source controls were 
added first, followed by retrofits for used cars. Only at high levels 
of control was it desirable (cost-effective) to institute bus service. 
At the very high levels of control necessary to meet the oxidant 
standard the model indicated that it would be necessary to reduce 
both trips by private automobile and bus trips. 
The above results followed from one set of technical assumptions. 
In order to determine the sensitivity of the indicated strategy to 
alternative estimates of the technical input parameters, alternative 
assumptions were made and the model was rerun. The key input 
assumptions to the model which were varied were the required 
reduction in oxidant level (the air quality model), reactivity, effec-
tiveness of catalytic reactors, applicablity of retrofits, and applica-
bility of stationary source controls. It was found that the model was 
highly sensitive to variations in all input parameters in the sense 
that a more pessimistic assumption for anyone parameter dictated 
much higher levels of control activity for all sources than in the base 
case. 
Formulation of the Final Plan 
The information briefly discussed above represented that avail-
able to the Task Force for the preparation of its final plan. It was 
clear that estimates of all the critical technical parameters varied 
widely among analysts. Furthermore, these differences in opinion 
appeared to derive directly from a lack of empirical observations 
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which could be used to resolve differences. There were no studies 
available which would show definitively how people, atmospheres, 
and machines would react to these controls. The Task Force was left 
with only a very crude approximation of the effects of alternative 
policies. And, to make the job of policy formation even more diffi-
cult, the estimates kept changing almost from day to day as new 
and/or different information became available. 
The result was the proposal of a second preliminary plan.34 The 
important aspects of the plan were 1) the admission that the use of 
all "reasonable" measures would not meet the standards, 2) an 
explicit requirement for state implementation of the plan, 3) an 
explicit time phasing of the implementation process commencing 
October 1, 1973, 4) a statement that gas rationing, even though 
impractical, will be used to the extent necessary to meet the stan-
dard in 1977, and 5) a statement that "the Agency will utilize every 
means available to avoid the need to impose impractical measures 
(such as gas rationing) to reach the goal by 1977."35 
After an opportunity for interested parties to comment, the 
"final" plan was published.3s It differed in detail from the previous 
proposed plan but basically reached the same conclusion: "How-
ever, the EPA does not believe that massive gasoline rationing is 
either socially acceptable or enforceable, and will work toward alle-
viating the neccessity for such drastic control in 1977."37 The main 
addition to this plan was the use of economic disincentives, primar-
ily parking surcharges. These provisions were subsequently res-
cinded, on January 15, 1974, because the Energy Emergency Act 
(which was then being considered, but was not passed by Congress) 
contained provisions which required that any disincentives such as 
parking taxes must be approved by Congress before they are in-
cluded in transportation control plans. 3s In addition, several minor 
revisions have also been made which have pushed back dates for 
required implementation of various provisions of the plan. 
Some progress is being made on the implementation of some parts 
of the plan.39 The Southern California Association of Governments 
(SCAG) produced a transportation control plan which includes pro-
visions for bus lanes and preferential treatment of buses very similar 
to the EPA plan. This transportation control plan is now being 
implemented. A parking management plan is in negotiation as well. 
A retrofit program for used cars is now being implemented. This 
program, which is less ambitious than required by the EPA plan, 
requires 1) the installation of vacuum spark advance disconnect 
(VSAD) devices on all 1955 to 1965 model year automobiles if there 
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is a change in ownership, 2) the installation of either a VSAD or an 
exhaust gas recycle (EGR) system on all 1966 to 1970 model year 
automobiles upon renewal of registration (hence all cars in this 
group will be retrofitted by the end of 1975),3) the voluntary instal-
lation of a catalytic converter on any automobile, and 4) the imple-
mentation of a required annual emission inspection and mainte-
nance program for all automobiles while retaining the random side-
of-the-road inspection system now being used in the LAAQCR. 
EPA's estimate of the effect of this program is that it will reduce 
peak hourly oxidant readings from 0.62 ppm (observed in 1970 in 
Riverside and 1974 in Uplands) to approximately 0.42 ppm. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES FOR OXIDANT CONTROL IN THE LAAQCR 
The observation that the peak oxidant level in the LAAQCR was 
as bad in 1974 as it was in 1970 highlights the range of uncertainties 
faced by policy makers. There are a number of alternative explana-
tions for this fact. It might have been an extraordinarily bad year 
meteorologically. Or, growth in population and VMT might have 
offset emission reductions achieved (at least on paper) between 1970 
and 1974, or emission reductions in practice might not have been 
as great as they were expected to be prior to implementation}O Or 
there may have been an entirely different reason-the causes have 
not yet been sorted out. Faced with massive uncertainty about all 
technical aspects of control, policy makers must search for a policy 
which will reduce these uncertainties while making progress in con-
trol. The Administrator is faced with a political strategy game as 
well. He must decide where he wants to go (what level of control) 
and how he is going to get there politically. In this section three 
alternative technical plans are set forth. A general scheme for imple-
menting and enforcing these plans is presented. Finally some judg-
ments are made about the benefits and costs of each alternative. 
Discussion of how the Administrator might obtain adoption of the 
preferred option will be left for the last section. 
Technical Control Alternatives 
The three technical control alternatives presented here range 
from a modest effort (the minimal strategy) which does not go be-
yond the efforts the CARB has already committed itself to, through 
an intermediate strategy, to the most stringent control strategy 
which the author feels could have a chance of being accepted by the 
people of Southern California.41 While not coinciding exactly with 
the results of the Rand study, these alternatives generally follow the 
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pattern it suggests. All of these controls are in addition to those 
included in the State of California's plan for the LAAQCR. Strate-
gies for the three proposed alternatives are summarized in Table I. 
Control options for stationary sources concentrate primarily on 
gasoline marketing and users of organic solvents. It is proposed that 
in all three strategies vapor recovery will be practiced for all phases 
of gasoline marketing, including the filling of individual cars. This 
system is presently being instituted in San Diego. The main obsta-
cle appears to be retrofitting automobiles to allow for vapor recov-
ery, although several gasoline filling nozzles have been designed 
which may make this unnecessary. Large users of organic solvents 
and surface coatings have previously been regulated by the 
LAAPCD's Rule 66. Carefully defining what constitutes a source 
and extending coverage of the rule to small operations would signifi-
cantly improve the situation. Currently any operation which re-
leases less than 140 pounds per day of RHC is exempt from control, 
even if several such operations are carried out at one site. The emis-
sions from the aggregate of all operations at the site may exceed the 
140 pound minimum, but they remain uncontrolled if no one opera-
tion emits more than 140 pounds per day. Sources thus have an 
incentive to break up operations in order to avoid control. For the 
minimal strategy it is suggested that Rule 66 be applied to all 
sources regardless of size or location. In addition, in the intermedi-
ate and stringent strategies it is proposed that Rule 66 be modified 
to require substantially greater use of high solids and water based 
coatings as well as water based printing ink. In all three strategies 
it is suggested that activated carbon adsorbers be installed on all 
dry cleaning operations and again, it is recommended that the small 
source exemption be removed. Also, in all three strategies 1, 1, 1-
trichloroethane would be substituted for current solvents in all de-
greasing operations. 
Some level of control of aircraft will occur without additional 
action. The modification of the JT -8D engines on 727 jets to reduce 
smoke also reduces RHC emissions. By 1977 there is expected to be 
a substantial replacement of 707's and DC-8's with the new wide 
body jets. These also have substantially lower emissions. In the 
stringent strategy the addition of towing and other ground controls 
at major airports (including military) is proposed. 
The control of mobile sources is complex. For heavy duty vehicles, 
the minimal strategy adds an inspection and maintenance scheme 
to the Federal and State new truck controls which are already being 
implemented. Also, PCV is to be installed on all trucks and buses 
SOURCE 
Stationary Sources 
Petroleum 
Production 
Refining 
Marketing 
Organic Solvents 
Surface 
coatings 
Dry Cleaning 
Degressing 
Mobile Sources 
Aircraft 
Heavy duty 
vehicles 
Motorcycles 
Light Duty 
vehicles 
Travel and Bus 
strategy 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF CONTROL STRATEGIES FOR OXIDANTS 
MINIMAL STRATEGY INTERMEDIATE STRATEGY 
Vapor recovery 
Maximum control is already being exercised 
Maximum control is already being exercised 
As per minimal 
Strengthen and expand 
Rule 66 
Activated carbon adsorber. 
Expand to .mall operators 
1, 1, 1- trichloroethane to 
replace other solvents 
Expand to small operators 
Modification of JT -8D 
engines, expanded use of 
wide-body jets 
Federal and state new truck controls 
Inspection and maintenance 
Ban 2 strike Reduce rapid growth 
Blowby, No control on 75% of 
1955·70 cars Maintenance and 
side of road inspection 
Bus and car pool lanes on primary 
freeways, Bus system expanded 
to 2200 vehicle. with free ride. 
As per minimal 
More extensive use of water 
based and high solids coatings 
As per minimal 
As per minimal 
As per minimal 
As per minimal 
Catalytic reactors on 75% of 
all 1966-74 trucks PVC on all 
1966-74 trucks 
As per minimal 
Restrict registrations 
As per minimal 
Catalytic reactors on 75% of 
1966-74 cars 
Bus ramp lanes and ramp 
metering, Bus system expanded 
to 4000 vehicles_ Parking 
restrictions Gasoline 
surcharge of $O.20/gallon 
STRINGENT STRATEGY 
As per minimal 
As per intermediate 
As per minimal 
As per minimal 
As per minimal 
Towing and other ground 
controls 
As per intermediate 
Evaporation controls 
catalytic reactors on 
1955-64 truck. 
As per intermediate 
As per intermediate 
Catalytic reactors on 75% of 
1955-65 cars Evaporative 
control on all 1955-69 cars 
Bus lanes on major streets 
Bus .ystem expanded to 7000 
vehicles Parking surcharge 
of $3.00 day Gasoline surcharge of $1.00/gallon 
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not so equipped. The intermediate strategy calls for the use of catal-
ytic reactors on at least 75 percent of the 1966-74 gasoline-powered 
heavy duty vehicles. The stringent strategy extends this measure to 
1955-65 heavy duty vehicles as well. In addition, evaporative con-
trols would be installed on at least 75 percent of all heavy duty 
vehicles. In all three strategies concentrated effort should be placed 
on the control of gasoline powered vehicles since these are greater 
emitters than diesel engines. 
Motorcycle control takes a different tack from other motor vehicle 
controls. This is because virtually no work has been done on technol-
ogies for the control of their emissions. Consequently the various 
strategies rely heavily on restricting ownership. Two stroke engines 
are much greater emitters than four stroke engines. Two stroke mo-
torcycles were only one-third of the 1970 motorcycle population yet 
they accounted for over 60 percent of estimated emissions. Conse-
quently two stroke motorcycles are banned from use in the basin in 
all three strategies. In addition, registrations of all motorcycles are 
limited to the 1973 level in both the intermediate and stringent 
strategies. This is necessary because controls on automobiles and 
gasoline taxes will make motorcycles more attractive. Since four 
stroke motorcycles emit approximately as much RHC and NO x per 
mile as a 1970 automobile, unrestricted growth would cause sub-
stantial increases in emissions. 
In the minimal strategy the only control for light duty motor 
vehicles is NOx reduction by the use of VSAD or EGR retrofit on 
75 percent of the 1955-70 model year cars. In addition a side-of-the-
road inspection and maintenance system is employed to help insure 
that controls on all cars are installed and operative. This strategy 
is basically a variant of the one now being used in parts of the Los 
Angeles basin. Catalytic reactor retrofits for 75 percent of the 1966-
74 cars and a loaded annual inspection are added in the intermedi-
ate strategy. The stringent strategy adds catalytic reactor retrofits 
for 75 percent of the pre-1966 cars. Finally, evaporation control 
systems are installed on all 1955-69 cars (1970 and newer cars have 
them as original equipment). 
In addition to these technical controls each strategy includes 
some efforts to attract people away from cars and into public buses 
and/or car pools. In the minimal strategy primary freeways would 
have one of the existing lanes dedicated to the exclusive use of buses 
and car pools (3 or more people per car). This has two effects. One 
is to make mass travel faster and the other is to restrict the mobility 
of the single occupant car. The bus system would be expanded from 
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1500 to 2200 buses with a corresponding increase in route miles and 
improvement in service characteristics. Bus service would be free. 
The intermediate strategy replaces bus lanes with ramp metering 
such as the system being installed on the Santa Monica freeway. 
The advantage of ramp metering is that all lanes are free flowing, 
not just the bus lane. Buses (and perhaps car pools as well) would 
have preferential access to the freeways. Cars will have to wait in 
line or drive through city streets. Restrictions will be placed on the 
supply of parking spaces in the major trip attraction centers with 
preference given to car pools. In the stringent strategy, bus lanes 
are added to major city streets as well. A gasoline tax of up to $1 
per gallon is also called for in this strategy. 
A rough approximation of the effect of these three alternative 
strategies is presented in Table II. It can be seen that increasing 
stringency of controls has a marked effect on predicted peak oxidant 
using the EPA air quality model discussed above. But peak oxidant 
is not the only relevant measure of air quality improvement. An-
other measure is the number of days which have oxidant readings 
above the federal standard of 0.08 ppm. In 1970, 250 days had peak 
oxidant readings above 0.08 ppm. Using the estimated emission 
reductions and the results of the EPA air quality model it is esti-
mated that the minimal strategy would reduce this to 150 days 
while the stringent strategy would reduce it to 37. Thus, it can be 
seen that small reductions in observed peaks yield large reductions 
in the number of days above the standard. This occurs because 
controls shift the frequency distribution of observed peaks so that 
many fewer are above the standard. The same phenomenon occurs 
when hours above the standard are calculated, but the effect is even 
more rapid. A 76 percent reduction in the peak represents a 85 
percent reduction in days above the primary standard and a 97 
percent reduction in hours above the primary standard. Surely the 
total exposure to oxidant is important in assessing damage reduc-
tions. In fact many health studies recognize this by using average 
exposure rather than peak exposure as their measure of pollution. 
This being the case, the number of hours above 0.08 ppm may be a 
better measure of control and, by implication, damage reduction, 
than is the peak oxidant. 
Before moving on to the discussion of implementation and en-
forcement, there is another control option which merits brief discus-
sion. This is the control of interior air. If there is a portion of the 
population which is more seriously affected by oxidants and which 
must remain in the basin when ambient oxidant concentrations are 
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TABLE II 
RHC EMISSIONS INVENTORY (TON!DA Y) 
MINIMAL INTERMEDIATE STRINGENT 
SOURCE 1970 STRATEGY STRATEGY . STRATEGY 
Stationary 349 130 85 85 
Petroleum 143 26 26 26 
Production 
Refining 5 6 6 6 
Marketing 138 20 20 20 
Organic Solvents 193 90 45 45 
Surface Coatings 98 54 27 27 
Dry Cleaning 6 
Degreasing 23 
Other 66 36 18 18 
Other Stationary 13 14 14 14 
Aircraft 38 25 25 15 
Heavy Duty Vehicles 111 51 41 20 
Motorcycles 27 22 14 14 
Light Duty Vehicles 1088 418 209 177 
VMT Reduction Effects 0 -29 -21 -60 
Total Emissions 1613 617 353 251 
Peak Oxidant (ppm) 0.62 0.28 0.19 0.15 
Days Over Standard 250 150 90 37 
Dosage Reduction (% reduction 
from 1970 level) 60% 92% 97% 
high, then this group may still markedly reduce their exposure to 
harmful levels of oxidant. A study conducted by Professors Saber-
sky, Sinema, and Shair indicates that interior photochemical oxi-
dant concentrations lag exterior concentrations by only a slight 
amount.42 Thus, the usual recommendation to remain inside on bad 
days does not appear to be very helpful. However, a simple acti-
vated charcoal filtering device can be used to reduce the oxidant 
level to well below the standard. The seriously affected person could 
install such a device and avoid much of the potential harm. The 
main problems with this technique is that it restricts mobility and 
may require the installation of central air conditioning to make the 
indoor air bearable on hot smoggy days. This means that it will be 
less accessible to the lower economic groups. However there is no 
obvious reason why such filters could not be installed in public 
buildings and perhaps automobiles as well. If exposure is important, 
this might be a cost-effective short-run alternative to major reduc-
tions in VMT. 
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Implementation Alternatives 
Having decided upon the level of control, the Administrator must 
decide how the plan will be implemented and enforced. There are 
two basic options available: regulation and economic incentives. 
The regulatory approach requires a given act such as the installation 
of a device. It has strong advocates and some advantages. A primary 
advantage is that it is more certain to achieve the desired effect. But 
it has disadvantages as well. For example, there are some 1966 
model year cars which can be effectively retrofitted with a catalytic 
reactor and some that cannot. Regulations would have to specify the 
cars to be excluded. This makes the regulation complicated and 
difficult for citizens to understand. Furthermore, it is likely to of-
fend the public's sense of equity since some people must install the 
device at substantial cost while others, who happen to own a similar 
but excluded car, would not bear similar costs. Another problem 
with regulation is that it provides no incentive to install more effec-
tive devices. For example, suppose that there are two devices which 
control emissions by at least the amount required by a regulation: 
one costs $20 and controls 20 percent, while the other costs $30 and 
controls 40 percent. The car owner would have no incentive to install 
the more expensive device even though it is more effective. Further-
more, with this form of regulation, firms are given an incentive to 
find the cheapest way to control emissions just to the required level, 
but no incentive to find more effective controls at the same or higher 
cost. 
Economic incentive systems may solve these problems. They re-
store equity between those similarly situated. They cause people, 
and consequently firms, to search for more effective as well as less 
expensive devices. The major problem with economic incentives is 
that they do not provide the certainty sought by control agencies. 
In the following proposal, the advantages of both systems are used 
while their major disadvantages are at least reduced, if not com-
pletely avoided. 
Finally, it is obvious that some adjustment in the current institu-
tional arrangement of air pollution control is necessary. Part of the 
problem of ineffectual control agencies is due to a fragmentation of 
authority. Movement should be toward a single regional air pollu-
tion control agency which has broadly based powers over both mo-
bile and stationary sources. This agency should also have a signifi-
cant input into the policy actions of a new regional transportation 
authority, which will have strong control over local transportation 
agencies. In order for the regional control agency to exercise this 
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control, I propose that it be the source of a major portion of funding 
for mass transit and highways. Another part of the problem has 
been the dependence of state and local control agencies upon politi-
cal bodies for the financing of their control activities. I suggest a 
financing scheme, such as the pollution permit fee discussed below, 
which will reduce this dependence, thus allowing the agency a freer 
hand to control without fear of political reprisals. 
Economic Incentives For Control 
The economic incentives proposed here have two basic goals. 
They provide polluters an inducement to decrease emissions. They 
also provide automobile drivers (and stationary sources, if we can 
think of a practical way to do it) an incentive to emit less during 
the crucial morning hours. The chief mechanism for achieving these 
goals isa pollution permit fee aimed at all polluters. In addition I 
propose several incentives directed particularly at the reduction of 
vehicle miles travelled. 
For automobiles the current registration fee would be replaced 
with a fee based upon the estimated emissions of the car. The con-
trol agency would first estimate, on the basis of annual samples, an 
average annual mileage and average emission per mile for each 
model year in order to obtain an estimated annual emission ofRHC, 
CO and NOx (in pounds per year). These emissions would then be 
multiplied by a fee per pound to determine the pollution permit fee. 
The car would not be registrable until the fee was paid. 
A hypothetical fee schedule for pollutants might set a charge of 
$.60 a pound for RHC, $.02 a pound for CO and $.50 a pound for 
NOx.43 Approximate registration fees for typical cars would then be 
about $57 a year for 1974 cars, $75 a year for 1970 cars, $104 a year 
for 1966 cars and $132 a year for 1962 cars. The system would have 
a retrofit rebate provision, which would reduce the fee by the 
amount of emissions prevented. Thus, if the owner of a 1964 car 
installed a VSAD device, he would save approximately $94 on the 
pollution permit fee. Since the annual device cost is approximately 
$52, it would pay for him to install the device. The fee schedule 
could, of course, be set at any desired leve1. 44 In order to accomplish 
its purpose, however, the charge per pound of pollutant should be 
set high enough to act as an incentive to install control devices. 
For motorcycles and aircraft the same system would be employed. 
Aircraft owners could reduce the fee through control efforts, includ-
ing the towing of aircraft at airports to reduce on-the-ground emis-
sions. Since two-cycle motorcycles are especially heavy polluters 
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they would pay high fees for on-road use (if such use is not banned). 
However, if they are used for off-road activities exclusively and thus 
are not registered, they would not pay the pollution permit fee. But 
this may be acceptable since this type of use is generally at the edges 
or outside of the air basin. All stationary sources regardless of size 
would be included in the pollution permit system and would pay a 
fee. The same fee schedule as used for mobile sources would be 
employed. Thus a solvent user who is just at the lower limit of 
current (1973) control and is emitting 140 lbs. of RHC per day, 6 
days a week, would pay an annual fee of $26,208.00 (140 lbs. x 312 
days x $0.60) in our hypothetical fee case. This would obviously give 
the firm an incentive for additional control, even if it already met 
the current standard. It could lead to the development of new tech-
nology. In addition, it would reduce the problems caused by firms 
which break up their operations so that individual sources within a 
plant are below the control threshhold. Thus, a firm would pay the 
same fee whether it had one operation emitting 140 lbs/day or ten 
operations, each emitting 14 lbs/day. 
The polluter permit fee system suggested here gives polluters a 
substantial incentive to control today. But it has an additional, and 
perhaps more important, advantage. The control cost per pound for 
stationary sources at currently available technology is much less 
than for mobile sources. It is very likely that further research into 
control alternatives would uncover many effective controls. The cur-
rent legal enforcement system places the burden for this research on 
EPA. The permit fee system would give the polluters an incentive 
to do this research. It would also provide a market for other firms 
to do this research and sell the resultant devices or process changes 
to polluting firms. Thus, the permit fee system is likely to lead to 
greater control and/or less expensive control over time due to its 
research-stim ulating feature. 
To encourage multiple occupancy and reduce automobile VMT, 
this proposal would prohibit the use of any car on major corridor 
freeways with less than three occupants between 6 and 9 AM and 
between 4 and 6 PM, unless a special tag is prominently displayed. 
This special tag would be obtained from the regional pollution con-
trol agency. A sizable monthly fee would be charged for this tag 
unless the driver could demonstrate an exceptional need to drive 
alone during these times and an annual income below a level set by 
policy makers. The multiple occupancy rule is necessary because 
the pollution permit fee provides an incentive to control emissions 
per mile but does not affect travel during the crucial periods for 
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peak oxidant production. This system would impinge mostly on 
trips to work and would provide people with an incentive to car-pool 
or to use public transportation. 
In addition to the permit system and multiple occupancy permit, 
a gasoline tax, which would vary with the season, is also proposed. 
Since the multiple occupancy rule would be applied only to free-
ways, it would provide no disincentive to driving on regular streets. 
One possible schedule might be a charge of $.20 per gallon in winter 
and $1.00 per gallon during summer months. The proceeds from this 
tax could be used to help finance the proposed free bus system. 
The above set of incentives would do little good unless a cheap 
and effective alternative mode of travel were available. It is fairly 
clear that highly subsidized, and preferably free, bus service should 
be instituted on a massive scale by 1977 if substantial VMT reduc-
tions are to be achieved. This system would be the responsibility of 
a regional transportation authority. Financing would be from diver-
sion of the current federal and state gasoline taxes as well as from 
the proceeds of the other proposed taxes and fees. Priority bus lanes 
could also be provided on city streets, as well as freeways, as a part 
of this system (depending upon the stringency of the plan adopted). 
This entire incentive structure can be used in combination with 
a system of regulation. The regulations would follow one of the three 
strategies discussed above (or some other alternative). A regulation 
would require that a particular action be taken. This requirement 
would be open ended in the sense that any action which reduces 
emissions by more than that required would be allowed. No penalty 
for non-compliance need be specified since those who are unable or 
unwilling to comply will be paying a higher pollution permit fee. 
In our automotive example discussed earlier,45 the owner of a 
typical 1964 car would find that non-compliance with a regulation 
requiring a reduction in NOx emissions of at least 40% would cost 
him $94 per year while compliance would only cost him $52 per year. 
Only if he owned a 1964 car which was extremely expensive to re-
trofit (i.e., over $94) would it pay not to comply with the regulation. 
Even then, however, the pollution permit fee provides him with an 
incentive to search for a retrofit system to control NO.x emissions. 
It will pay him to install any device which costs less than his savings 
on the pollution permit fee, even if it does not meet the regulation. 
The advantage of the combined system is that it maintains the 
incentive structure and at the same time provides assurances that 
at least the minimum controls specified by the regulations will be 
implemented in most cases. Only in cases where control is much 
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more expensive than the average or expected cost, would individuals 
or firms violate the regulations. These cases may be more than offset 
by cases where the incentive system induces control measures 
greater than those regulated. The important point is that under the 
current system of standards, delay can reduce cost; but in the incen-
tive system, delay is more costly than control. 
Enforcement and Monitoring 
It has become increasingly clear that enforcement of air pollution 
controls is a major problem. Slack enforcement will lead to substan-
tial increases in actual emissions. Current enforcement efforts in the 
Los Angeles AQCR, while better than in most air basins, could be 
vastly improved.46 
The enforcement program I propose includes several components. 
Primary among them is a major increase in the personnel and re-
sources devoted to enforcement of controls. Coupled with this would 
be the development and implementation of an effective emission 
monitoring system. To the extent possible this system would consist 
of on-site continuous monitoring devices for stationary sources. 
Where this is not possible, proxies, such as down-wind ambient air 
monitors and/or random inspections by control personnel, would be 
used. For mobile sources, I propose a substantial increase in the 
number of side-of-the-road emission inspection stations. The cur-
rent average frequency of inspection for stationary sources is about 
once every year. The average frequency for mobile sources is approx-
imately once every year and one half. Both of these frequencies 
should be increased to something like once every three months for 
sources which cannot be continuously monitored. These inspections 
should be unannounced. 
In order to insure that these proposals are truly effective in con-
trolling emissions, an information feedback system should be insti-
tuted to check on the progress and effectiveness of the plan. With 
this information the enforcement, monitoring and fee schedules can 
be adjusted as necessary. 
Costs, Benefits, and Air Quality 
As pointed out previously, emission control estimates are highly 
uncertain in terms of both cost and effectiveness. For example, the 
cost of producing a retrofit device is usually estimated by engineers 
by assuming fixed input prices and some unspecified volume and 
rate of production. However, if more devices are required in a 
shorter period of time, costs may be several times the estimate. In 
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addition, recent inflation has more or less destroyed the assumption 
of fixed input prices. 
An even more difficult cost to measure is the welfare loss to the 
people of the basin due to the required shifts in transportation 
modal choices and the reduced drivability of retrofitted and new 
automobiles. One way to estimate this cost is to measure the value 
people place on the transportation foregone when the price is in-
creased. There is a problem in obtaining such an estimate because 
only the very roughest of estimates of the demand curve for trans-
portation is available. 
Never.theless some sort of cost estimates would seem necessary, 
if only to place the preceding proposals in perspective. A rough 
approximation of the costs of the three strategies which have been 
discussed is presented in Table III. They are based on 1973 esti-
mates of control costs from EPA internal studies, from the studies 
conducted by the Rand Corporation, and from my own studies. 47 
TABLE III 
APPROXIMATE COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 
(Millions of Dollars) a 
STRATEGY COMPONENT MINIMAL INTERMEDIATE STRINGENT 
Stationary source coTItl'ols 20 60 60 
Motor vehicle retrofits 100 400 540 
Bus system expansion 80 500 780 
Parking, Transportation controls 70 200 300 
Welfare loss 0 250 2000 
Total annual cost 270 1410 3680 
Approximate cost (dollars 
per family per year) b 90 500 1250 
a These are only rough approximations and should be taken as no more. They are derived 
from various sources as cited in the text. 
b This assumes that all control costs are passed on to Los Angeles residents, which 
certainly overestimates the impact on them by some unknown amount. 
There is not sufficient information currently to estimate the dol-
lar value of the benefits of controlling oxidants. All that can be done 
is to cite observed effects at various exposures. This has been done 
in the Appendix for health effects. In addition, there are damages 
to plants caused by ozone. Visible plant damages have been shown 
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to occur at levels as low as 0.1 ppm peak hourly oxidant. The most 
common symptoms are yellow or white blotches on leaves, excessive 
dropping of leaves and fruit, and dried brown edges on flowers. In 
addition, yields of agricultural crops such as citrus fruit and grapes 
are substantially reduced by exposure to oxidant. Visibility (a 
highly valued characteristic in Southern California) is substantially 
reduced by the products of photochemical smog (primarily aerosols 
and NOz). At approximately 0.08 ppm oxidant Mount Baldy is 
clearly visible from Riverside. At approximately 0.2 ppm it is no 
longer visible and the Box Springs Mountains (only 2-3 miles away) 
become hazy. At approximately 0.4 ppm even the Box Springs 
Mountains disappear and everything becomes hazy. 
A very rough and admittedly judgmental comparison of the bene-
fits and costs of the three alternatives studied are presented in 
Table IV.48 This comparison indicates that the implementation of 
the minimal plan can result in a substantial reduction in health 
effects and a substantial improvement in aesthetics at a seemingly 
small cost. The intermediate plan could substantially eliminate 
observed health effects in man, with the exception of eye irritation, 
as well as attain even greater improvements in aesthetics. The cost 
of this plan may be too high for these benefits, however, especially 
for low income families. A financing method which would reduce the 
payments for control by lower income groups may be warranted in 
order to obtain general acceptance of this plan. The stringent plan 
reduces eye irritation and provides additional insurance against 
possible radiomimetic effects. The cost both in monetary terms and 
reduced mobility are very high. One wonders if the insurance is 
worth this cost (it appears as if the people of Los Angeles have 
decided that it is not). 
PLAN 
Minimal 
TABLE IV 
ROUGH BENEFIT/COST COMPARISON FOR ALTERNATIVE PLANS 
PEAK OXIDANT ANNUAL COST HEALTH AND AESTHETIC 
(ppm) $/FAMILY BENEFITS 
0.28 90.00 Virtual elimination of lung con-
(0.15-0.40)8 striction & throat irritation 
Some reduction in Elimination of decreased pul-
ease of movement monary function effects 
but no trips fore- Reduced possible radiomimetic 
gone effects 
Substantial increase in number 
of clear days and virtual 
elimination of days with very 
poor visibility 
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Intermediate 
Stringent 
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0.19 
(0.10-0.30) 
0.15 
(0.08-0.25) 
500.00 
Greater reduction in 
mobility & a rela-
tively minor number 
of trips foregone 
Possible increases 
in platinum oxide 
particles which are 
a health hazard 
1,250.00 
Substantial reduction 
in mobility and at 
least a 20% reduc-
tion in number of 
trips taken 
Even greater levels 
of platinum oxide 
particles 
Substantial reduction in visible 
damage to pine trees, orna-
mental plants, etc. 
Substantially reduce (if not 
eliminate) increased aging of 
red blood cells, structural 
damage to heart muscles, 
increased chromosomal abnor-
malities, decreased visual 
activity, asthmatic attacks, 
coughing, chest discomfort 
Further reduce chances of 
radiomimetic effects 
Even greater increases in visi-
bility 
Even greater improvement 
in conditions of plants 
Substantially reduce but not 
eliminate susceptibility to 
infections, eye irritation, neo-
natal mortality 
Further reduce chances of 
radiomimetic effects 
Still greater improvements in 
visibility but some unclear days 
remain 
Still greater improvements in 
the condition of plants but 
some visible damage and crop 
loss will remain 
a This represents the author's very judgmental assessment of the possible range of 
outcomes of each plan. By comparison, it should be noted that 0.27 ppm is the first alert 
stage for oxidant in Riverside County. At readings above this level school children cannot 
go outside to play at recess or participate in physical education classes. 
V. POLITICAL STRATEGY AND BARGAINING 
On Friday, June 15, 1973 the Acting Administrator of EPA repro-
posed a control plan for the LAAQCR. 48 Two days previously he had 
announced to the Los Angeles press that he would go to Congress 
to seek a change in the Clean Air Act to exempt Los Angeles from 
meeting the ambient air quality standard for oxidant by 1977. His 
stated reason for seeking a delay was that the level of vehicle mile 
travel restrictions needed to reach the standard is far beyond any-
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thing reasonable. This conclusion is consistent with the technical 
analysis presented here under any reasonable set of assumptions. 
The state and local authorities have responded to this plan, and to 
the November 12, 1973 final plan (which is roughly equivalent to my 
intermediate strategy), with a control program substantially weaker 
than the EPA proposal, although somewhat more stringent than 
their original proposed plan which EPA had rejected. 
The EPA position appears to recognize that the final control effort 
in the LAAQCR will be the result of extensive bargaining. The 
strategy they use in this bargaining could be very important in 
determining which plan is eventually adopted for Los Angeles. 
There seem to have been two strategies available to EPA in 1973. 
One was to declare any more stringent plan than that proposed by 
EPA to be too costly relative to the benefits. The Administrator 
would hope that this decision would be seen by both pro-control and 
anti-control political factions as a very rational compromise. In this 
way he would gain acceptance from both sides and the plan would 
be adopted. This appears to be the strategy which EPA followed, 
but it does not seem to have worked. 
The alternative strategy grows out of the realization that political 
decisions are by nature elaborate bargaining systems. A compromise 
is reached through offers and counter-offers by the interested par-
ties. If EPA is supposed to be the political representative of the pro-
control faction, then this alternative strategy called for it to bid for 
more control than the Administrator actually expected to attain, in 
order to leave room for compromise to the level he prefers. The State 
of California offered a very weak control plan. The Administrator's 
statement and the final plan represent a counter-offer which is also 
relatively weak. This leaves little room for bargaining. If the final 
plan is EPA's preferred position (that is, if they are following the 
first strategy) and the state does not agree to the plan (which it has 
not), then a level of control below that desired by EPA will result. 
The pro-control political faction might feel that EPA has chosen the 
less preferred alternative. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The people of Los Angeles are faced with a most confusing situa-
tion. Public officials and private analysts have widely differing 
views of the problem and its solution. On the one hand they are told 
by the Los Angeles APCD that if EPA would just leave them alone 
the problem will be solved by 1980. Even more incredibly they were 
told in 1970 by Governor Reagan that the problem was already 
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solved. Others tell them that it is impossible to solve the problem 
without killing the local economy. At the same time they are told 
that their children should not play outside a substantial number of 
days per year. They blame Detroit, the oil refineries, the steel mills, 
and the other guy for causing the problem. They seek an easy solu-
tion and are offered a kaleidoscope of options to choose 
from-everything from hydrogen-powered cars to fans in the sani-
tary sewers. In reality there are no easy solutions. The problem is 
caused by them, by the firms they work for, and by the government 
they control. They must make the hard choices about how much to 
control and how clean their air should be. 
lt is reasonably clear that some level of control beyond that al-
ready in existence in 1974 is socially desirable. But how much more? 
This question cannot be answered with the available facts. The 
studies summarized here indicated that we only have the very crud-
est of guesses as to the emissions of pollutants in 1970, as to the 
effectiveness and applicability of control options, or as to the sav-
ings in human suffering and property damage which might result 
from control. Politicians, faced with total disagreement on many 
aspects of the technical analysis understandably turn to political 
rather than technical criteria in their decisions. In the face of these 
uncertainties the politically expedient thing to do is to go slow while 
making a show of going fast. 
What are the chances that a plan such as that suggested here will 
be adopted and implemented in the near future? In my opinion, 
there is virtually none. Even if EPA wanted to, and it is not clear 
that it does, it has no real power to force local officials to comply, 
short of calling in Federal Marshals to stop traffic, which would be 
politically unacceptable. Only the local electorate can do it and they 
have shown little inclination to do so yet. If the population in gen-
eral favors improved control, they will get it. If not, I submit that 
Congress and EPA are political realists, and they will fold in the 
face of local resistance to control. 
In the meantime, do not be fooled by calls for more study before 
implementing any additional controls. More studies are needed but 
by their very nature thay cannot provide the certainty anti-control 
groups call for. This can only be done by experimenting with policies 
in the real world. Time-phased implementation of a control program 
is one way to make progress and collect needed information. The 
longer the delay in implementation, the less desirable will be the 
retrofit portions of a control program. This seems like a saving be-
cause these control expenses can be avoided. However, the higher 
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oxidant levels which result from delay cause increased health and 
aesthetic damages. Delay is not costless. Moving ahead can reduce 
the political influences on environmental policy by providing the 
information needed to produce reliable technical and economic ana-
lyses of policy options. 
The lesson to be learned from the Los Angeles experience is that 
any attempt at air pollution control will have to deal with a highly 
complex and grossly uncertain world. Simple solutions just do not 
work. What is needed is a set of institutions which explicitly take 
these complexities and uncertainties into account. These institu-
tions must be flexible in order to adjust to new information. They 
must also provide incentives to move ahead and to collect informa-
tion which allows control agencies (and the people in the air basin) 
to determine how successful controls are. The set of institutions 
suggested here is a first attempt at designing such a system. Ob-
viously, much more work on these issues is needed. 
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APPENDIX 
Summary of Selected Health Effects on Exposure To 
Photochemical Oxidant 
Extent and Duration of 
Exposure 
A. Demonstrated Adverse Effects 
0.08 ppm for 3 hours 
0.1 ppm and above 
Observed Effects 
Increased susceptibility to streptococcal bacteria 
infection in mice. eo 
Eye irritation in man." 
0.1 and 0.2 ppm for 7 hours Increased neonatal mortality in offspring of 
per day for 3 weeks exposed mice.52 
0.2 ppm for 1 or 2 hours 
0.2 ppm for 5 hours 
per day for 3 weeks 
0.2 ppm for 5 hours 
0.2 ppm for 3 hdbrs 
0.25 ppm daily maximum 
hourly exposure 
0.25-0.30 ppm daily 
maximum hourly exposure 
0.3 to 0.8 ppm average 
for 8 hour workday 
0.37 ppm for 2 hours 
Increased aging of red blood cells in mice." 
Reversible structural changes in cells of heart 
muscle fibers of mice." 
Increased chromosomal abnormalities in hamsters." 
Decreased visual activity for dark adaptation and 
middle vision ranges in man. ,. 
Increased frequency of asthmatic attacks in man." 
"Threshold" for increased coughing and chest 
discomfort" in man. 
Complaints of chest discomfort and throat irritation 
by workers." 
Decreased pulmonary function after moderate 
exercise in man. eo 
B. No Demonstrated Adverse Effects 
0.13 ppm daily maximum 
hourly exposure 
0.05-0.28 ppm daily 
average exposure 
0.2-0.25 ppm average 
for 8 hour work day 
Ambient concentrations 
in Los Angeles 
No significant increase in asthmatic attacks 
in man.'· 
No effect on ventilatory performance of school 
children. " 
No complaints of chest discomfort and throat 
irritation of workers." 
No significant effects on mortality due to occurrance 
of smog-alert days in man." 
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